Foreign exchange market intervention in emerging markets: motives, techniques and implications by Muhammad Al-Jasser et al.
BIS Papers No 24  265
 
Foreign exchange intervention in Saudi Arabia 
Muhammad Al-Jasser and Ahmed Banafe 
1. Introduction 
Saudi Arabia has a fixed exchange rate regime, with the riyal pegged to the US$. The dollar/riyal 
exchange rate has remained fixed at 3.75 since June 1986. As foreign exchange is predominantly 
earned by the government, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) provides the foreign 
exchange needs of the private sector by selling dollars against Riyals to the domestic banks. 
Typically, speculation against the riyal tends to be in the forward market (due to its off-balance sheet 
characteristics) in times of oil market weaknesses combined with falling foreign exchange reserves. 
SAMA intervened in the forward foreign exchange market on two occasions - August-December 1993 
and July-September 1998. 
2. Macroeconomic  considerations 
As a resource-based economy, Saudi Arabia’s reliance on oil revenues for budget formulation is quite 
pronounced. Oil revenue constitutes about 75% of total government revenue. It may be noted that the 
oil sector’s contribution to GDP is about 35% and the non-oil sector’s (private sector and government) 
about 65%. Saudi Arabia’s nominal GDP growth averaged 5% pa and the cost of living index about 
1% pa during the 1990s. The current account balance of payments position has turned positive since 
1999, with noticeable surplus build-up lately both in absolute terms and as percent of nominal GDP. 
The government’s commitment to pursue prudent fiscal policy, combined with better oil revenues in 
2003 and 2004, resulted in budget surpluses in 2003 and 2004, which has been helpful in paying 
down debt. 
The fixed exchange rate regime has worked well in Saudi Arabia due to the country’s foreign currency 
receipt and payment pattern and the mandatory 100% currency backing by foreign exchange 
reserves. The currency backing factor puts a ceiling on currency in circulation (it cannot exceed 
foreign exchange reserves). SAMA foreign exchange operations are conducted within the confines of 
the regime attributes. Forward intervention in defence of the domestic currency could create 
vulnerability for countries with excessive short-term foreign currency liabilities and a weak banking 
system. Saudi Arabia’s net creditor position and a strong banking system have been supportive in 
curbing sporadic forward exchange rate volatility and stabilising the market. In the event of forward 
intervention, SAMA’s outstanding forward contracts with counterparties would settle only when they 
made payments in riyals to take delivery of their forward dollar purchases. As SAMA has full control on 
the supply and availability of riyals, short riyal sellers would find it both difficult and costly to honour 
their part of the commitment. 
3.  Governance and motives 
SAMA chooses the foreign exchange regime in consultation with the government but foreign 
exchange intervention is carried out at SAMA’s discretion within the confines of the exchange rate 
regime. SAMA has operational and goal independence. SAMA’s foreign exchange intervention has 
been infrequent and goal-specific, ie maintaining exchange rate stability and preserving financial 
stability. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves via foreign exchange intervention has not been a 
policy objective. 
As for Riyal exchange rate adjustments against the dollar, they are initiated by SAMA, coordinated 
with the Minister of Finance and endorsed by the Head of the Council of Ministers. During the 1970s, 
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±7½% margin relative to the riyal’s parity of 4.28255 against the SDR, expressed in dollar terms. The 
margins were suspended on 22 July 1981 to avoid having to devalue the riyal beyond the margins for 
technical reasons as the dollar kept on rising against the SDR during the first half of the 1980s. 
4.  Causes of speculation 
They are listed below in order of importance and interconnections: 
•  Falling oil prices and oil revenue 
•  Falling foreign exchange reserves 
•  Balance of payments considerations 
• Negative  press 
•  Real effective exchange rate 
• Contagion  effect 
During the first half of 1986, speculation against the riyal was triggered by a combination of lower oil 
prices, widening budget imbalances, falling foreign exchange reserves and a deteriorating balance of 
payments position. Against these macroeconomic odds, Saudi Arabia devalued the riyal in June 1986 
from 3.65 to 3.75 to the Dollar. The small devaluation of the riyal by 2.7% against the dollar was meant 
to signal to the market that balance of payments considerations warranted devaluation. In fact, the 
riyal’s devaluation against major floating currencies has been much higher by virtue of its peg to the 
dollar, which was on the course of a sharp downward correction during the mid 1980s. 
During 1993, negative press about Saudi Arabia’s twin deficits (budget and balance of payments) and 
falling foreign exchange reserves in the aftermath of the Gulf War caused speculation against the riyal. 
The situation did not warrant riyal devaluation but a timely intervention in the forward market. 
During 1998, speculation against the riyal was linked to oil market weakness following the Asian 
market crisis and its implications for global growth. Exaggerated movements in forward prices 
warranted intervention in the forward market. 
In all the above cases, the oil market weakness has been a catalyst for speculation. This is because of 
a misconceived perception that a devaluation of the riyal would result in higher revenue (translation 
effect). Typically, the translation effect is offset by the transaction effect in Saudi Arabia’s open 
economy. Foreign exchange operators/speculators are short-term punters seeking to benefit from their 
short riyal positions in the event of a devaluation. They mistakenly conceive that a riyal devaluation 
raises government revenues and a riyal revaluation results in losses to government on its (a) foreign 
exchange reserves and (b)  riyal revenue derived from oil sales in dollars. It may be noted that 
translation effect in respect of (a)  is accounting and not economic, as higher riyal revenues via 
currency devaluation are largely offset by the higher cost of imports. Translation effect in respect of 
(b)  is relevant to the extent of net domestic expenditure. There is no exchange effect on direct 
government expenditure incurred abroad. The component of government expenditure which is 
exclusively in riyals (payrolls and purchases of goods and services in the local market) is to a certain 
extent offset by exclusively riyal revenues. A depreciating riyal would inevitably increase the riyal cost 
of any foreign exchange component of domestic purchases made by the government. It follows that 
any gains to government revenues in riyal terms from a devaluation of the riyal against the dollar are 
rather illusory unless justified by macroeconomic reasoning/balance of payments considerations. 
5. Intervention  tactics and their effectiveness 
Speculation in the forward market pushes up foreign exchange swap points, resulting in higher interest 
rates. Domestic banks, being market makers, keep on adjusting their forward quotations for each 
incremental transaction amount, as they ultimately seek to cover short forward dollar positions by 
buying dollars from SAMA. The consequent drain in system liquidity exacerbates interest rate rises. 
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discounts in the intervening period. Speculation, if left unchecked, would lead to market destabilisation 
and have cost implications for the economy. 
SAMA’s intervention policy is to intervene in foreign exchange markets on a discretionary, rather than 
a systematic basis, and only in exceptional circumstances to counter disruptive short-term movements 
in the riyal money market. SAMA’s intervention may be characterised as both passive and active. In 
terms of passive intervention/foreign exchange operation’s, SAMA keeps on providing spot dollars to 
the market regularly to meet the private sector’s foreign exchange requirements. Given this set-up and 
the fact that speculative pressure tends to be in the forward market, active or proactive intervention 
appears to be appropriate in the forward market. There are concerns in some circles that the 
leveraging factor in the forward market could pose a serious problem for the authorities in honouring 
their commitments, and subsequently forcing them to devalue or float the currency. This argument 
holds for overvalued currencies vulnerable to unsustainable capital inflows (eg the Asian financial 
market crisis of the late 1990s). 
SAMA’s intervention tactics included gathering relevant information from the domestic banks, such as 
size of open positions, origin of transactions and volume of trading. SAMA conducted both direct and 
indirect (via agents) intervention and let the market know about it ex-ante. SAMA’s experience has 
been quite positive in smoothing disruptive market movements and curbing volatility in forward pricing 
through small-sized forward intervention. 
SAMA intervened in late 1993 and Q3 of 1998 when the dollar/riyal interest rate differential ranged 
between 1 and 2%, as opposed to ¼ to ½% in normal times. At times, forward intervention was 
backed by money market intervention in the form of liquidity injection through deposit placements and 
foreign exchange swaps to make a pronounced effect in lowering swap points. Intuitively, if 
intervention yielded a profit, it would reduce exchange rate volatility, and if it entailed losses, it would 
be an additional source of exchange rate instability. On both occasions, SAMA’s modest intervention 
totalling US$ 655 m in 1993 and US$ 820 m in 1998 worked in stabilising the market (ie achieving the 
ultimate objective). This indicates unsustainability of speculative action against economic 
fundamentals underpinning the currency. 
6.  Cost of speculation 
As Saudi riyal interest rates track US dollar rates due to the exchange rate peg, it is initially 
inexpensive to speculate against the riyal (the narrow interest rate differential means a small forward 
premium for the Dollar). Generally, higher interest rates are seen as a necessary consequence of the 
defense against speculation. 
Arguments in favour of interest rate support might sound reasonable to some extent, but the 
authorities’ prolonged indifference could have cost implications for businesses and economic activity. 
Excessive volatility in market conditions and exchange rate overshooting would warrant official 
intervention to steady the foreign exchange market and manage domestic interest rates. In fact, 
interest rate support for the exchange rate or interest rate penalty for speculators could be short-lived 
unless accompanied by sound macroeconomic fundamentals. 
In Saudi Arabia, the cost of defending the peg in 1993 and 1998 was insignificant to the overall 
economy judging by the small size of intervention and the short period of volatility. This has partly to 
do with the absence of hot money inflows and the sound banking system. Though profitability from 
foreign exchange intervention was not an objective, it resulted nonetheless when forward contracts 
were liquidated. 
7. Domestic  implications 
The government is the major source of foreign exchange supply, being the sole recipient of oil 
revenue. Operationally, SAMA’s routine sales of dollars to the domestic banks are meant to meet the 
private sector’s commercial and financial demand for foreign currencies. Under normal circumstances, 
foreign exchange operations have no discernible effect on money market conditions. In the event of 
excessive foreign exchange outflow for speculative or event-specific reasons, there tends to be an 268  BIS Papers No 24
 
imbalance in system liquidity, causing interest rates to rise. However, application of liquidity 
instruments, such as repos and foreign exchange swaps, has been instrumental in addressing money 
market disequilibrium to a large extent. Given the steady supply of foreign exchange to the private 
sector through the domestic banks, sporadic speculation against the riyal has been in the forward 
market. SAMA’s foreign exchange intervention in the forward market did not have to be sterilised, as 
forward intervention is a less costly means of conducting sterilised intervention. 
8. Conclusion 
SAMA’s intervention in the light of the foregoing can be summed up as follows: 
1.  SAMA succeeded in breaking the momentum by “leaning against the wind” (acting against 
the basic trend which is more relevant in the case of managed currencies) and stabilising the 
market. 
2.  The profitability criterion (used for measuring success or failure) was satisfied.  
3.  From a longer-term perspective, forward foreign exchange intervention might not lead to a 
drastic drain of reserves, given SAMA’s control on the supply and availability of riyals. 
4.  Finally, cognisant of the fact that there is no alternative to fostering sound monetary and 
fiscal measures to steer the market in an orderly manner and maintain public confidence in 
the currency, Saudi Arabia paid close attention to macroeconomic stability (including the 
exchange rate) through fiscal adjustments reflecting the revenue pattern and through 
avoidance of foreign currency borrowing to finance the budget deficit. 
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Appendices 
(tables and graphs) 
a)  US$/riyal (SAR) official exchange rates 
b)  Current account balance 
c)  Real effective exchange rates 
d)  US$/SAR spot rates and swap rates 
Graphs are self-explanatory showing pre- and post-intervention price movements. 270  BIS Papers No 24
 
 
US$/SAR official selling rates 
 Rate  %  Change 
End December 1960  SAR 4.50  - 
End December 1971  4.145  8.5 
End December 1973  3.56  16.6 
End December 1975  3.54  0.5 
End December 1977  3.50  1.0 
End December 1978  3.30  6.1 
End December 1979  3.37  –2.1 
End December 1980  3.33  1.2 
End December 1981  3.42  –2.6 
End December 1982  3.44  –0.6 
End December 1983  3.50  –1.7 
End December 1984  3.58  –2.2 
End December 1985  3.65  –1.9 




Current account balance 
(in SAR billion) 





as % of GDP 
1991 80.8  –184.4  –103.6  –21.1 
1992 74.6  –141.0  –66.4  –13.0 
1993 61.4  –126.1  –64.7  –13.1 
1994 79.3  –118.6  –39.3  –7.8 
1995 90.9  –110.8  –19.9  –3.7 
1996 131.9  –129.3  2.6  0.4 
1997 128.1  –127.0  1.1  0.2 
1998 41.9  –91.2  –49.3  –9.0 
1999 93.3  –91.7  1.6  0.3 
2000 185.8  –132.2  53.6  7.6 
2001 146.9  –111.9  35.0  5.1 
2002 159.9  –115.4  44.5  6.3 
2003 229.4  –118.1  111.3  13.8 
2004
e     193
e 20.7
e 
Exchange rate: SAR 3.75 per US dollar since June 1986. 
Source: SAMA Annual Reports. 
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